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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
I. EMiLoxns's Commox LAw LIABnmr FOR IwNJUpEs TO A
Fnia ow ExripLoin
Williams v. Bebbington and McNaughton v. Sims2 discussed
the question of whether section 72-401 of the South Carolina
Workmen's Compensation Law, which exempts certain em-
ployers and those conducting their businesses from common law
liability, applied to the co-employees in these two cases. In
Williams, the plaintiff and the defendants were employed by
E. I. DuPont de Nemours at its Savannah River Plant. On the
morning of the accident, the plaintiff was driving to the Sa-
vannah River Plant where he was injured at approximately
7:40 a.m. (DuPont did not pay for his travel time or expenses.)
After proceeding on DuPont property for five miles, the plain-
tiff turned into a "pull out area," and stopped his car. As he
walked around to the rear of his vehicle, he was struck by the
defendants' vehicle. His legs were crushed between the front
and rear of the two cars.
The defendants in Williams claimed exemption from common
law liability under the following provision of the Workmen's
Compensation Law:
Every employer who accepts the compensation provisions
of this Title shall secure the payment of compensation to
his employees in the manner provided in this chapter. While
such security remains in force he or those conducting his
business shall only be liable to any employee who elects to
come under this Title for personal injury or death by acci-
dent to the extent and in the manner specified by this
Title."
The defendants relied heavily on the language "those conduct-
ing his business" as the basis for exemption. The South Caro-
lina Supreme Court had examined this question in two other
cases, Nolan v. Daley4 and Powers v. Powers.5 In Nolan, the
court construed this phrase to mean that a co-employee is
1. 247 S.C. 260, 146 S.E2d 853 (1966).
2. 247 S.C. 382, 147 S.E2d 631 (1966).
3. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 72-401 (1962). (Emphasis added.)
4. 222 S.C. 407, 73 S.E2d 449 (1952). For a discussion of the Nolan
decision and other related cases, see 5 S.C.L.Q. 473 (1953).
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exempt only if the injury "arises out of, and in the course of,
his employment." 6 The injury sustained in Nolan was the result
of the alleged negligence of a co-employee during the perform-
ance of duties on a construction job. Powers involved a wrongful
death action in which the injury arose out of an airplane acci-
dent while the plaintiff's deceased was traveling on his em-
ployer's business. The plaintiff asked the court to overrule
Nolan on the strength of the dissent in that opinion. The court
in Powers rejected this argument and denied the plaintiff recov-
ery. However, in Tilliams, the court indicated that the factual
situation in this case was beyond the scope of work incident to
the employer's business. None of the parties were required to do
work outside the Savannah River Plant building. The plaintiff
had not applied for or received any benefits under the Work-
men's Compensation Law. The court affirmed the lower court's
judgment for the plaintiff, thus the denying defendants' claim
of exemption.
The factual situation in the McNaughton case was very simi-
lar to that in *Williams. The plaintiff sustained injuries as a
result of an automobile accident which occurred as the em-
ployees were leaving the plant parking lot at Springs Cotton
Mills. The lower court granted the defendant's motion for a
nonsuit on the grounds of the alleged exemption under section
72-401 of the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Law.
Again the supreme court held that in the absence of any sugges-
tion that the parties were performing any work incident to the
employer's business, the exemption would not attach. The de-
fendants in each of the above cases relied on Ferrell v. Beddow,
7
a 1962 Virginia decision. Virginia's Workmen's Compensation
Law is very similar to South Carolina's. However, in the Ferrell
case, though the injury was sustained while en route to the busi-
ness premises, the employees were charged with a task related
to their employment. As the South Carolina court pointed out,
the Virginia court recognized the Ferrell factual situation as an
exception to the general rule that an employee going to and
from his place of work is not engaged in any service incident
to or growing out of his employment. Thus, these two decisions
indicate that the Ferrell decision is an accurate statement of
the rule in South Carolina.
6. 222 S.C. 407, 416, 73 S.E.2d 449, 453 (1952).
7. 203 Va. 472, 125 S.E.2d 196 (1962).
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II. CoUws-. oF E=LOYANr
Walker 'v. City of CoZumia8 represents the appeal of a circuit
court order affirming an Industrial Commission award for
death by coronary thrombosis of a Columbia police officer.
Officer Walker was off duty at his home about a half mile
beyond the city's corporate limits. About 3:00 in the afternoon,
he noticed that a neighbor, who seemed to be intoxicated, was
driving out of the driveway and up and down the street in a
reckless manner. Walker reported the incident to the highway
patrol. When a patrolman and a deputy sheriff arrived and
prepared to place the neighbor under arrest, he resisted strenu-
ously. It took all three officers to subdue him. Shortly there-
after, Walker began to feel ill and suffered a coronary throm-
bosis. He was hospitalized and died within two hours.
The appellants contended that Walker's death was not a result
of an accidental injury arising out of the course of employment
since he was off duty and outside the city limits at the time of
the accident, and was thus without authority to make an arrest.
However, as the court pointed out, Walker was not making an
arrest. The highway patrolman had called in the county deputy
sheriff as the proper arresting party. It was the violent resist-
ance of arrest which necessitated Walker's direct involvement.
Evidence and testimony at the trial made it clear that the city
police regulations required a police officer to protect and aid a
fellow officer under pain of dismissal. "Fellow officer" had
been defined by the department to include any officer of the
law whether in the city's employ or not. Thus, the court found
that Walker was engaged in the performance of his duties as
he and his immediate superiors understood them. The court
viewed the regulations in the policeman's manual as having the
practical effect of conditions of a contract of employment. It
seems clear that in cases involving a definition of course of
employment, the court, relying on more well-settled principles
of contract law, will give great weight to the job definition as
the employer and employee conceive it, rather than applying
any general test.
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III. INDusTnIAL Commssion's FACT FINDING AND ORDER
IN CONFLIC~T
Amic v. City of Colmbia9 involved a denial of a city police-
man' claim for medical benefits under workmen's compensa-
tion. In 1960 the plaintiff had sustained a compensable injury
to his back and hips. He continued to have pain and, at the
time of the hearing in 1962, was still receiving therapy for this
pain. No compensable disability was claimed. The plaintiff
sought only medical benefits for treatment based on the conten-
tion that his condition resulted from the 1960 accident. Though
the Commission found that part of the subsequent treatment was
connected with the work injury, it denied the claim in toto. The
court recognized this inconsistency and affirmed a lower court
reversal of the Industrial Commission's order and remanded the
case for an order consistent with the Commission's findings of
fact. Though the Commission's findings of fact are conclusive,
the court will reverse its order if, as here, the order and the
findings of fact are inconsistent.
IV. PROCEDURAL REQUIREM3ENTS
A. When Employer Estopped to Assert the One Year Limita-
tion on Filing of a Claim.
Hueks 'v. Green's Fuel ' raised the question of what conduct
constitutes a waiver of the one year filing limitation by the
employer or his insurance carrier. In Hucks, the employee was
injured in May of 1962 but failed to file a claim until February
of 1964. The South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Law
requires that an injured employee give notice of the occurrence
of an accident within thirty days, unless the Commission can
be satisfied that there was a reasonable excuse for the delay. 1
In addition, the right to recovery under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law is barred unless the claim is filed with the Indus-
trial Commission within one year after the accident. 2 Appel-
lant-employer had asserted the one year filing limitation as a
defense to the claim. Respondent-employee had contended that
the employer was estopped to raise this defense. The Commis-
sion found that the claimant, through his attorney, was misled,
9. 247 S.C. 254, 146 S.E.2d 860 (1966).
10. 247 S.C. 457, 148 S.E.2d 149 (1966).
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-301 (1962).
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-303 (1962).
[Vol. 19
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albeit unintentionally, by the conduct of the employer during
negotiation for a settlement and thus failed to file his claim.
The attorney had negotiated with an agent of the employer's
insurance carrier who, while denying that the injury was com-
pensable, offered a settlement of 500 dollars. This offer was
rejected in April of 1963. In August of that year the carrier
advised that it was closing its file since the statutory period for
filing had expired without a claim being filed. The lower court
affirmed the Commission's decision for the employee. The
supreme court reversed and remanded.
It is well settled in South Carolina that negotiations may give
rise to a waiver of this statute of limitations if the claimant is
induced thereby to forego filing a claim. However, in this case,
the attorney, acting for his client, rejected a proposed settle-
ment before the statutory period had run. Thus, he still had
ample time to file a claim. Apparently the attorney had ex-
pended a great deal of time in attempting to collect medical
evidence and testimony as to the relationship between the claim-
ant's present condition and his condition prior to the accident.
The court inferred that the attorney's decision to negotiate
informally was greatly influenced by this evidence problem.
This, rather than the conduct of the employer and the carrier,
was the reason for failure to file. The court held that the
employee had the burden of proving that he was misled into
thinking that his claim was compensable and that he should
not file a claim. Affirmative evidence established clearly that
the carrier had repeatedly denied compensability. The court
also held that the attorney was considered to be the respondent's
alter ego and that any lack of diligence on his part would be
binding upon his client. This case serves as a warning to attor-
neys who may feel forced to straddle the fence in shaky work-
men's compensation cases. Though the court may be more
lenient as to the thirty day notice of injury, it will require sub-
stantial proof before it invokes estoppel to aid the claimant who
is not misled but merely lulled into complacency.
B. Estoppel; Thirty Day Period for Filing Notice of Accident
with Employer.
The respondent-employee in Mize v. Sangamo Eee. Co.""
claimed benefits for partial and permanent disability arising
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from an alleged accident during the course of employment. The
employer defended on the grounds that the notice of the accident
was not filed within thirty days, the claim for compensation
was not filed within one year and the accident did not arise
out of the course of employment. The Industrial Commission
granted an award which the circuit court affirmed. The
supreme court centered its attention on the thirty day notice
defense. Section 72-301 of the South Carolina Code provides
in part:
[N]o compensation shall be payable unless... written notice
is given within 30 days after the occurrence of the accident
... unless reasonable excuse is made to the satisfaction of
the Commission for not giving such notice and the Com-
mission is satisfied that the employer has not been preju-
diced thereby.14
Though the Commission made a finding that the respondent's
injury had arisen out of the course of employment, it made no
finding as to whether respondent had a reasonable excuse for
failing to report the claim within thirty days. (It also made
no finding as to whether the respondent had met the one year
filing requirement under the provisions of South Carolina Code
section 72-303.) The court pointed out that it is the duty of the
Commission to determine factual issues. Neither the circuit
court nor the supreme ,court can make factual determinations
except as to jurisdiction. Thus, the court reversed and remanded
the case for further factual findings.
C. Unemployment Compensation Recipients May Be Estopped
Thereby to Claim Workmen?'s Compensation.
Harvey v. Art Metal, Inw.15 presents the question of whether
a claimant's application for and receipt of unemployment com-
pensation bars him from compensation or medical benefits due
him under the Workmen's Compensation Law. This is a case
of novel impression in South Carolina. In August of 1962, the
appellant sustained a compensable back injury. He received
medical care and temporary total disability compensation until
February of 1963, when he was declared able to return to
"light" work. He returned to his job but found it too taxing
14. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 72-301 (1962).
15. 247 S.C. 443, 147 S.E.2d 697 (1966).
[Vol. 19
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and was forced to stop work. At that time he applied for unem-
ployment benefits but was rejected because of his history of a
disabling physical condition. In March of 1963, the claimant
secured a job with Butte Knitting Mills which required even
less physical activity. Nevertheless, he continued to suffer pain.
In May of 1963, he returned to the hospital for an operation and
during that time his employment with Butte was terminated,
not because of his absence or disability, but because of a general
employee cutback. Four days after his release from the hos-
pital, the claimant applied for unemployment compensation
based on his termination at Butte Mills. In his application, he
made no reference to his disability and explained that his
unemployment was the result of an employee cutback. He indi-
cated his readiness and availability to work as soon as he was
needed. His application was approved and he began receiving
unemployment compensation in June 1963.
In this action, the claimant sought temporary total disability
compensation and medical expenses from February 1963 when
payments were discontinued. The single commissioner found
that the claimant was entitled to reinstatement of these benefits,
minus the eighteen weeks during which he received unemploy-
ment benefits. The hearing commissioner ruled that these pay-
ments should continue until the claim had reached the maximum
medical improvement with no resulting disability. On appeal,
the full Industrial Commission held that the claimant was
entitled to benefits only until June of 1963 when, as they saw
it, he had reached maximum medical improvement. As they
put it: "This opinion is based on the fact that the employee-
claimant started drawing unemployment compensation on this
date, and, in so doing, made himself available for the labor
market."16
The circuit court affirmed the award of the full Commission
on two grounds: (1) the claimant was estopped to claim Work-
men's Compensation by his receipt of unemployment benefits
and his assertion then that he was able and available for -work,
(2) the Commission's finding as fact that the claimant did not
suffer compensable disability after June 1963 was supported by
competent evidence and was conclusive.
At the outset, the supreme court pointed out that this finding
of fact upon which the circuit court and the Commission based
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their denial of the claim was based on the assumption that the
application for unemployment benefits was prima facie proof
of maximum recovery. This finding was not based on any con-
sideration of evidence bearing on the claimant's actual physical
condition as of June 1963. Thus, if the assumption was founded
on an error of law, then the entire opinion would be in error.
What the employer and its carrier raised was the question of
equitable estoppel. Equitable estoppel is a protection afforded
one who has relied on a false representation or a statement
based on concealment of material facts known to the party who
makes the representation. The respondents based their assertion
of equitable estoppel on the claimant's alleged misrepresenta-
tion of his state of health in applications to Butte and to the
South Carolina Employment Security Commission. However,
as the court points out, it is well settled in South Carolina that
equitable estoppel is used to prevent an injustice to one who
invokes it; it is not used to penalize or punish the adversary
party. The court concluded that whatever effect the claimant's
alleged misrepresentation had on Butte Mills and the South
Carolina Employment Security Commission, Art Metal, Inc.
and its insurance carrier were not harmed by it. Thus, the court
held that although a claimant's application for and acceptance
of unemployment compensation may be used as evidence of
whether the disability continued and may even be conclusive
against a disability award, it cannot be viewed as raising an
estoppel to any relief.
Though the court seems to decide very directly that estoppel
cannot be raised in a conflict between workmen's compensation
and unemployment compensation, the larger question of how
a claimant can be able to work for purposes of unemployment
compensation and disabled under workmen's compensation at
the same time remains unanswered. The court viewed the prob-
lem of duplicating payments as one of statutory construction
not raised in the lower court and therefore not properly before
it. The majority of states seems to favor some sort of set off
arrangement 17 as a way of minimizing the inconsistency, a view
which the single commissioner in this case seemed to favor. Yet
the cases which deal directly with this problem usually involve
17. For a discussion of application for, or receipt of, unemployment com-
pensation benefits as affecting a claim for workmen's compensation, see
Annot., 96 A.L.PR2d 941 (1964).
[Vol. 9
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unemployment compensation and workmen's compensation
claims arising out of the same employment.
V. Wmw INDUSTmAL CotIISSIoN's FiNDINGs OF FACT
AR CoNcLusivE
He'ndon v. Morgan Hills, Ino.Is involved a challenge of the
Industrial Commission's finding that there was a causal connec-
tion between claimant's deceased's death from myeloma and an
injury sustained while in the employ of Morgan Mills. This
case is as much a discussion of rules of evidence as it is of
workmen's compensation law. However, the supreme court does
restate some familiar but very important principles of law in
this area. The burden of proof in workmen's compensation
cases rests on the claimant who must show by the preponderance
of the evidence that his claim is a valid one. In this case, the
claimant offered no medical testimony to support the claim that
there was a causal connection between the deceased's myeloma
and his work accident. However, the Commission made an
award on the basis of its finding that there was such a causal
connection. The court pointed out that although the Commis-
sion's findings of fact are conclusive where there is a conflict
in the evidence, these findings can be examined on appeal to
determine whether there was any competent evidence to support
them. The supreme court saw this finding as one based on spec-
ulation and surmise. The only expert medical testimony offered
was to the effect that no one knew the cause of myeloma.
Though expert testimony is not binding on the Commission, the
supreme court affirmed the lower court's reversal of its decision
as one not supported by competent evidence.
JFA M. HOEVE
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